REFUGEES

By Mark A. Heller^*

If Prime Minister Netanyahu's call for accelerated talks on a permanent status agreement with the Palestinians is serious, it is important that he and the rest of the country appreciate the necessary to think beyond the question of maps. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is certainly about territory, and the demarcation of boundaries will naturally assume a central place in deliberations about permanent status, just as it does in current deliberations about the further redeployments of the interim agreement. Moreover, many of the other permanent status issues, such as settlements, some of the security arrangements, and even Jerusalem, are actually subsumed by the decision on the future border between Israel and the Palestinian state that will emerge from any permanent status agreement.

There is, however, one major issue that is related only indirectly to the territorial dimension of the conflict, the refugees. And unless this issue is also addressed, a permanent status agreement, however detailed in other respects, will not provide the definitive resolution of the conflict that is the entire purpose of the peace process.

The refugee issue is specifically listed in the Declaration of Principles as a permanent status issue, but it has been practically ignored in all the negotiations since 1993. One reason is that the PLO itself has not pushed very hard. The DOP, by transplanting the PLO from the "outside" to the "inside," has focused Palestinian attention and energy on state-building by the Palestinian Authority. Progress in the peace process now promises tangible achievements for the Palestinian leadership and population in the West Bank and Gaza, but virtually nothing beyond symbolic satisfaction for Palestinians elsewhere, and there is little incentive to dramatize this point by pressing for negotiations that are unlikely to lead anywhere.

Secondly, the refugee question is not only the issue least connected to boundaries; it is also the issue least susceptible to settlement on a bilateral basis. Israel and the PA alone cannot agree to dissolve UNRWA or provide either the political or financial resources needed to rehabilitate and absorb Palestinians not under their jurisdiction. In addition to the 1.2 million refugees in Jordan (including about 250,000 in camps), there are about 350,000 in Lebanon, and almost as many in Syria. In the last two countries (and in most other Arab countries), Palestinians have no citizenship; in Lebanon, they are even denied regular residency rights and work permits. Unless they all move to the Palestinian state, which is highly unlikely, or to Israel, which is even less likely, some normalization of their status will be necessary, and this requires the involvement of the host-country governments. But Syria and Lebanon have thus far refused to take part in the multilateral working group on refugees.

Finally, Israel itself has been extremely reluctant even to think about the refugee issue, much less begin to negotiate it. Israel's approach reflects, not just a negotiating stance, but a national narrative. According to this narrative, if the Arabs had not opposed partition by force in 1948, there would have been no war, and if there had been no war, there would have been no refugees. Thus, responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem lies with the Arabs, and so does responsibility for finding a solution.

But even if this narrative is true in the sense that Arab rejectionism was the enabling cause, it is also true that in many cases, Palestinians became refugees, not because of general panic related to the war, but because of specific actions by Israeli forces. The most celebrated such case is documented in the second edition of Yitzhak Rabin's memoirs, which restores a passage, deleted by the censor from the first edition, describing the forced evacuation of Arabs from Lod and Ramle.

In any case, this is not just a historical investigation, and even if the refugee issue is not Israel's responsibility, it is Israel's problem. For whatever the precise division of responsibility, it is clearly in Israel's interest to ensure that the refugee question does not persist as a canker on the body of a permanent status agreement and remain as an obstacle to the finality that Israel needs, above all else, from any peace settlement.

The problem is obviously not going to be resolved by implementing the Palestinian "right of return," at least in the traditional interpretation of that right, which means return to the exact places that Palestinians left fifty years ago. There is no point in separating Jewish Israel from Arab Palestine if the decision about the Jewish character of Israel after partition is to be left in the hands of Palestinians -- regardless of how few or many might choose to exercise their "right."

But precluding this option does not exhaust all the possibilities, even of what the "right of return" means. If the refugees and their descendants cannot return to their homes, they can, after a Palestinian state is established, return to their homeland. Repatriation of some, however, can only be one element in a comprehensive package, which will also have to address questions of compensation for lost property, integration into other countries for those who cannot or will not return to Palestine, and some family reunion on a humanitarian basis (which is already happening). And since the sense of forced dispersion of refugees is central to the Palestinian national narrative, some recognition of the human tragedy and of Israel's role in it will eventually play a part, as well.

These are immensely complicated and emotionally-laden questions. On the material dimension, for example, it will be necessary to determine what compensation will be given to whom on what basis, how a compensation regime will be administered and financed, and what arrangements will apply to Jews who lost property in Arab countries. And on the moral dimension, any acknowledgment by Israel of its role in the refugee tragedy will need to elicit some Palestinian recognition of the suffering inflicted on Israel during all the years of the conflict.

At this point, more uncertainty surrounds the refugee issue than any other question on the agenda. It is not even clear who needs to be involved in its resolution, except that the Palestinian interlocutor must be, not the PA in the West Bank and Gaza, but the PLO, as the representative of the entire Palestinian people. Tackling the issue will take a long time and require a lot of creative thought, involving the slaying of some sacred cows on both sides. But unless that is done, there can be no real reconciliation, hence, no real peace. It is therefore vital to recognize the problem and begin thinking about it now.

^*Mark Heller's refugee article from the JERUSALEM POST