Masters Thesis Defense by Younan Chen
Virtual
https://umassd.zoom.us/j/93122572245?pwd=pAbPjoJ6be8iqBQkHyzub5lfYBOfWK.1
Target Audience: Faculty and & Staff
Category: Thesis/Dissertation Defense
Title of Defense: Masters Thesis Defense by Younan Chen
Title of Paper: The Effect of In-Person versus Remote Others on Moral Decision Making
Abstract: People often assume that moral decisions reflect stable internal moral values, yet moral judgments can be context-dependent, especially in high-conflict dilemmas that involve competing moral principles: utilitarianism (i.e., maximizing the greater good) versus deontology (i.e., preventing intentional harm). One such context is perceived observation. Research suggests that perceived observation is associated with higher rates of deontological judgments. Prior work, however, has relied on highly unrealistic hypothetical dilemmas in which the action is confounded with the utilitarian choice. In addition, no study has compared the effects of remote versus in-person presence of others on moral decision making. The current study examined (a) the effect of observation type on moral decision-making in the context of historical moral dilemmas, (b) affective and cognitive predictors of utilitarian preference, and (c) the effect of dilemma framing on moral decision-making. Participants (N=136 undergraduate students) were assigned to one of three conditions: Alone (in the laboratory; n = 52), Remote Observation (3+ participants in a Zoom meeting with cameras on; n =52), and In-Person Observation (3+ participants in the laboratory room; n = 32). Participants completed a survey consisting of 12 moral dilemmas and measures of mood, arousal, need for cognition, reputation concern, empathy, and perspective-taking. Observation type did not significantly affect utilitarian preference, F (2, 133) = 0.46, p=.631, η2=.007. Utilitarian preference was significantly predicted only by reputation concern and empathy. Specifically, utilitarian preference was associated with higher reputational concern (β = .258, p = .004) and lower empathy (β = −.188, p = .048). In addition, participants were significantly more likely to make utilitarian judgments for dilemmas in which the action coincides with the utilitarian option (M = .80, SD = .21) than for dilemmas in which the action coincides with the deontological option (M=.57, SD = .24), t(135) = 9.68, p < .001, demonstrating a robust framing effect or an action bias. The results suggest that the mere presence of peers (whether in person or online) may be insufficient to shift moral decision-making. Or, compared to unrealistic hypothetical dilemmas, ecologically grounded dilemmas may promote more internally driven moral judgments that are less sensitive to perceived observation. The associations between utilitarian preference and both reputation concern and empathy align with dual-process theories of morality which propose that utilitarian judgments rely more heavily on “cold” cognitive processes, whereas deontological judgments are more strongly influenced by emotional responses. More broadly, this study suggests that the effects of perceived observation may be more nuanced than previously assumed, with individual differences in reputation concern and empathy emerging as reliable predictors.
Keywords: moral decision-making, moral judgment, moral dilemmas, utilitarian preference, deontology, social observation, peer presence, reputation concern
Advisor: Dr. Mary Kayyal
Committee Members: Dr. Trina Kershaw, Dr. Nicholas Zambrotta
Contact Email: mkayyal@umassd.edu